"The way of Progress and Civilization": Racial Hierarchy and US State Building in Haiti and the Dominican Republic (1915-1922)

Stephen Pampinella
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations
SUNY New Paltz
JFT 814, 600 Hawk Drive
New Paltz, NY 12561
845.257.3549
pampines@newpaltz.edu

Accepted at Journal of Global Security Studies, November 3, 2020 (pre-publication version)

Abstract
Racial stratification remains critically undertheorized in hierarchy studies. Postcolonial analyses demonstrate how diffuse systems of racial knowledge produce unequal subjectivities in world politics, but they are often criticized for making overdetermined explanations that do not account for agency or contingency. To rectify this theoretical lacuna, I develop a postcolonial-practice theory approach to explain variation in the intensity and duration of governance hierarchies. I argue that racialized discourses constitute the habitualized dispositions of dominant and subordinate actors and make possible specific governance practices. This approach can account for puzzling cases of successful resistance by some subordinates while others languish under intense domination. Two such cases are US state building interventions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic during the early 20th Century. By using a variety of primary archival and public sources, I demonstrate how ideas about racial differences among Anglo-Americans, Dominicans, and Haitians led US policymakers to enact a more long-term and domineering occupation of Haiti compared to the Dominican Republic. Once Dominican elites articulated a European-Spanish identity in opposition to blackness, they mobilized support from other Latin American states and made US withdrawal practical. A postcolonial-practice explanation is useful because it addresses the limitations of both narrow and broad approaches to the study of hierarchy. Its focus on the contestation of US hierarchies further contributes to hegemonic-order theory while illustrating how the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion shape imperial rule and strategies of anti-imperial resistance.

Acknowledgements
For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Lourdes Aguas, Mauro Caraccioli, Tobias Lemke, Michael McIntyre, Jeffrey Meiser, Andrew Szarejko, Randolph Persaud, Eric Rittinger, and Srdjan Vucetic. I also thank Julia Thornton and Conor Tobin for their research assistance.
Introduction

IR scholars no longer take for granted that sovereign states relate to each other as equals. Instead, they acknowledge that hierarchy is pervasive in world politics and have developed a robust research agenda that investigates its various dimensions. These include the politics of US overseas basing (Cooley 2012), the normative ranking of states based on their treatment of women (Towns 2010), and the application of imperial forms of control to domestic politics (Barder 2015).

One aspect of hierarchy, racial stratification, remains critically undertheorized. IR scholars’ traditional interest in great power competition led them to ignore European imperialism and its normalization by discourses of white supremacy (Krishna 2001, Henderson 2013). Contemporary scholars have begun to incorporate race into their analyses of status immobility (Ward 2013), stigmatization (Zarakol 2010), and the persistent set of hierarchical sub-systems within a broader system of anarchy (Hobson and Sherman 2005). This research suggests a need to center race within hierarchy studies and address what W.E.B. Du Bois (1900/1970:125) called “the problem of the color-line, the question as to how far differences of race – which show themselves chiefly in the color of the skin and the texture of the hair – will hereafter be made the basis of denying to over half the world the right of sharing to their utmost ability the opportunities and privileges of modern civilization” (see also Anievas, Manchanda and Shilliam 2015).

In this article, I use a race-centric analysis informed by postcolonialism to explain variation in hierarchies between dominant and subordinate actors. Mainstream theories of hierarchy and asymmetry frame these relationships in terms of the capacity of weaker actors to resist the demands of strong counterparts and affect their policy choices (Lake 2011, Long 2015).
However, these approaches do not examine how macrostructural contexts unequally constitute actor subjectivities and define their capacities for establishing and contesting hierarchies. A key element of that context involves knowledge about both actors’ racial identity, which shapes how they interpret their relationship to each other and the interactive process of bargaining. I argue that a focus on racialized knowledge and the social construction of identities best explains the dynamics of bargaining and contestation between actors in hierarchical relationships. A racialized lens enables us to account for puzzling cases of successful resistance by some subordinates while others languish under intense domination despite both making similar demands for self-determination.

Two puzzling cases involve the early 20th Century US occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. To explain variation in the intensity and duration of these hierarchies, I rely on the recent turn in IR toward Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological theory. A Bourdieusian analysis allows me to identify habitualized dispositions (Pouliot 2017) as the causal mechanism that links the intersubjective structure of racial discourses to micro-level practices of imperial governance. By using a variety of primary sources, I demonstrate how ideas about racial difference held by Anglo-Americans, Haitians, and Dominicans led policymakers to enact a more long-term and domineering occupation of Haiti compared to the Dominican Republic. My analysis focuses on the consequential years between 1915 and 1922. Racial stratification prevented Haiti from contesting US rule by rendering impossible US consideration of its claim to self-determination and inhibiting the formation of a supportive international coalition. Given these circumstances, withdrawal from Haiti never became practical to US policymakers. However, US withdrawal from the Dominican Republic became commonsensical once it climbed the ranks of the racialized order by articulating a European-Spanish identity and
mobilizing other Latin American states. A postcolonial-practice explanation demonstrates the limits of more narrow approaches that emphasize consent, liberal norms, and the restraining effect of US domestic institutions.

This research makes two main contributions. First, it contributes to the project of decolonizing security studies by examining how exclusion and difference shape the dynamics of hierarchy (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004, Adamson 2020). As Vitalis (2015) and Blatt (2018) have demonstrated, early 20th Century IR focused on the problematique of administering inferior races in a globalizing world. By centering race in the study of hierarchy, we can turn IR against the white supremacist logic perpetuated by its founding. Below, I demonstrate how subaltern resistance was delegitimated and undermined on the basis of racial difference by emphasizing the agency of dominant and subordinate actors. By claiming whiteness, Dominican elites gained inclusion into a broader transnational identity that legitimated their claims to sovereign self-determination. However, Haitian claims to autonomy were ignored because of their Black identity, and Haiti was continuously excluded from equal membership among sovereigns in the Western hemisphere. Generating this type of knowledge allows us to extend “the postcolonial moment” (Barkawi and Laffey 2006) into hierarchy studies by illustrating how Eurocentric discourses inform agent responses to moments of contention based on their relational position and representations of their racial identity. In addition, it can highlight the strategic challenges which must by overcome by advocates of anti-racism and anti-imperialism.

Second, a postcolonial-practice analysis contributes to hegemonic-order theory, which evaluates how hegemons and subordinate actors establish and contest governance arrangements (Ikenberry and Nexon 2019). Both occupations are instances of state building, a type of
intervention that violates liberal order principles of sovereignty and self-determination\(^1\) while seeking to restore them. My approach demonstrates how US policymakers embody this contradiction by relying on the same categorical inequalities that made possible European imperialism and which limit the agency of occupied peoples. Despite the global expansion of liberal norms and transnational resistance to US occupations, the persistent structure of racial stratification enabled US officials to ignore Haitian claims to self-determination and exacerbate the imperial characteristics of their rule. Given its regional focus, a practice theory analysis of race within these occupations further contributes to a postcolonial reinterpretation of US-Latin American relations (Rittinger, unpublished manuscript).

I proceed as follows. In the first section, I illustrate the relevance of postcolonial IR for thinking about sovereign inequalities. I then demonstrate how practice theory enables us to link Eurocentric discourses to the actions of policymakers who establish various kinds of authority over subordinate states. In the second section, I show how the practice of imperial governance in Haiti and the Dominican Republic was informed by racialized dispositions that shaped policymaking at key points in the trajectories of both interventions. US policymakers sought variations in hierarchy based on representations of each state’s racial identity in relation to the United States and the forms of resistance undertaken by local and transnational actors. I conclude by discussing future avenues of research and reflect on the necessity of transnational solidarities when challenging racial hierarchies.

**Theorizing Variation in International Hierarchies**

Race in IR has been a primary focus of postcolonialism, an interdisciplinary sensibility that emphasizes how Eurocentric knowledge casts the West as superior to the East and Global

Postcolonial IR scholars assume that binary constructions of racial difference constituted sovereignty and anarchy as organizing principles among “modern” European states while legitimizing imperial rule over “backward” Asians, Africans, and indigenous peoples on the American continent (Chowdhry and Nair 2003, Persaud and Walker 2001). From this perspective, contemporary liberal discourses of governmentality originate from the same racialized knowledge that legitimated colonial hierarchies. Non-Western societies are defined as potential threats to be redesigned and disciplined for the good of all humanity through intervention and global governance (Hardt and Negri 2001, Jabri 2013, Epstein 2014). Since sovereign recognition is conditional upon adopting Eurocentric institutional forms, former colonies which became states during postwar decolonialization are unequally constituted (Grovgogui 1996).

Postcolonial scholars seek to offset the dominance of Eurocentric discourses by recovering the voices of subordinated peoples and their unique contributions to modernity (Grovgogui 2006, Shilliam 2011). The recent wave of scholarship tracing postcolonial arguments back to the early 20th Century contributes to this project. In this period, activists and intellectuals including Du Bois and Alain Locke argued that racialized constructs permitted colonial forms of domination despite the formal extension of sovereignty (Vitalis 2015, Henderson 2017). Their proposals for hybrid and novel forms of self-rule emerged from the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and its supposed failure to meet a Eurocentric standard of civilization (Shilliam 2013, Getachew 2019, see also Gong 1984). Sovereign inequality can thus be traced back to a three-step hierarchy differentiating “civilized,” “barbaric,” and “savage” societies that corresponds to phenotypical stratification with white Europeans and European settlers on top and Black Africans on the bottom.
Although hierarchy is at the heart of postcolonial IR, its focus on the production of subjectivities offers limited explanations of how agents form unequal relationships in contingent moments (Mattern and Zarakol 2016:645-647). Within hierarchy studies, postcolonialism is situated alongside other “broad” approaches, including poststructuralism, in which stratification is organized by diffuse intersubjective structures (Zarakol 2017:7-8; Barnett and Duvall 2016:55-57). These macro-level approaches answer “how possible” questions by telling us about the conditions that constitute subjects and their associated practices (Klotz and Lynch 2007:15). But they alone cannot link those structural conditions to specific actions that generate governance hierarchies. When power is “everywhere and nowhere” (Thompson 2005: 78), deliberation and purposiveness are ignored. This theoretical lacuna inhibits postcolonial theorists from offering more comprehensive explanations of specific relationships.

The main alternative to macrostructural approaches analyzes the narrow relationship between two unequal actors. Whether generated by a rationalist logic of consequences or a normative logic of appropriateness (Lake 2011, Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, Bukovansky et.al. 2012), these approaches assume that actors are constituted prior to social interaction and purposely enter into hierarchies. A dominant actor’s authority requires consent from subordinates, yet consent can be withdrawn if more autonomous arrangements become preferable. A focus on narrow relationships parallels the new literature on asymmetries between the United States and weaker sovereigns (Musgrave 2019). According to Long (2015), weak states can challenge US policies when opportunities arise for influencing domestic politics and by forming international coalitions around specific issues.

Contemporary debates about US hegemony, empire, and liberal order illustrate why postcolonial IR must address the agentic dimension of hierarchy. The narrow approach to
studying unequal relationships complements historical accounts of the United States as a benevolent global hegemon. Ikenberry (2011, 2015) argues that the United States made imperial hierarchies obsolete by relying on sovereignty and self-determination as the basic principles of a liberal world order. The structure of US domestic institutions combined with liberal norms contributed to US restraint and the emergence of a more consensual ordering that limited the intensity of US hierarchy (Ikenberry 2001, Meiser 2015). Hegemonic-order theory has evolved from analyzing the rise and decline of hegemons to evaluating bargaining and contestation over governance arrangements among dominant and subordinate states (Ikenberry and Nexon 2019).

Although critics make a strong case that the liberal order narrative ignores the imposition of US authority over sovereigns in the Global South (Acharya 2014, Parmar 2018), precisely how unequal relationships are established despite anti-imperial resistance and in relation to race has yet to be established. Since variation in how the United States enlists local proxies is shaped by policymakers’ perception of racial inferiority (Rittinger 2017), we should expect that the overall hierarchical relationship between dominant and subordinate actors is also affected by their understandings of racial capacity.

The literature on US state building interventions, in which a sovereign state (or states) occupies another to administer its territory and reconstruct its institutions, demonstrates this theoretical gap. During state building, an occupied state loses its Westphalian sovereignty (the right to non-interference in one’s domestic politics) in the name of restoring its domestic sovereignty (the ability to authoritatively govern one’s territory) while its international legal sovereignty remains intact (Krasner 1999:19-23). Although state building interventions appear to meet Doyle’s (1986:30-38) definition of informal empire (one state’s control over another’s

---

2 This definition is drawn from Miller (2013:205, 218) and Pei et. al. (2005:64-65).
domestic politics), scholars are divided over the degree of hierarchy enacted during these occupations. Some echo mainstream arguments about liberal order by arguing that state building respects sovereignty and self-determination (Donnelly 2006:151, Miller 2013:5), while others claim that the United States and United Nations employ discourses of good government and development to justify imperial rule over occupied peoples (Chandler 2006).

If postcolonial claims about racial hierarchy are correct, then we should see fine-grained variation in the intensity and duration of governance hierarchies established during state building interventions based on racial differences. At issue is the locus of invested authority, or which actor, dominant or subordinate, claims the residual right to rule over the occupied state (McConaughey, et. al 2019). Postcolonialism suggests that when subordinate actors are represented as white or civilized, they can make a stronger claim to authority and better contest the terms of hierarchy in relation to a dominant actor. But when subordinate actors are represented as maximally different, we should expect dominant actors to invest authority in themselves in a more imperial fashion and ignore subaltern resistance. However, evaluating these hypotheses requires applying a postcolonial lens to a theoretical framework that allows for agency and contingency.

Translating Structure into Action: The Embodiment of Racial Hierarchy

I argue that practice theory, a sociological framework developed by Bourdieu (1977; 1990) and Erving Goffman (1959; 1967), can enable a postcolonial explanation of state building hierarchies. Its object of study are practices, or patterns of action that performatively establish one’s social competence based on intersubjectively-held background knowledge (Adler and Pouliot 2011:6). Practices are guided by the logic of practicality, or a commonsense of the social game, which suggests how human beings can engage each other in a given situation (Pouliot
An actor’s understanding of competent practices is a function of how discourses and past experiences imprint upon its subjectivity and become an embodied disposition, or *habitus*. One’s disposition to perform specific practices is associated with a position in a stratified field of power relations and the pre-given rules governing interactions within it. Within the field, agents pursue symbolic capital, or any socially recognized resource of value, from other actors by engaging them through competent performances. The adoption of socially valued practices leads actors to embody their field position and advance within the field relative to others (Ibid:46).

Practice theory can be adapted to postcolonial analyses by building on Bourdieu’s theorization of colonialism (Go 2013). It allows us to examine how the racialized field structures dispositions and establishes the value of symbolic capital, thereby suggesting what kinds of governance practices enable subordinate actors to demonstrate competence and advance within the macro-level global field (Go 2008b, Nexon and Neumann 2018). An actor’s embodied disposition emerges from experiential exposure to racialized knowledge while embedded in its social relations, and these meanings inform its practical responses to unique situations. In this way, *habitus* becomes the “micro-mechanism” (Pouliot 2017:123) that translates Eurocentric discourses of racial difference into agent practices at specific moments of contestation. An actor’s disposition tacitly suggests what practices can be plausibly performed in a given social situation, but it does not fully determine them. Actors retain their agency and capacity to adopt new performances in response to unforeseen and novel circumstances.

A practice theory analysis of hierarchy also complements the relational turn in constructivist IR. Both relationalists and practice theorists understand authority relations as

---

3 Bourdieusian scholars present this feature of his social theory as distinct from Foucault, whose poststructuralism is understood as inhibiting explanations of agency or how agents reproduce discourses. See Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992:25, ft. 46), Cronin (1996), and Callewaert (2006).
orchestrated phenomena in which actors contest each other’s unequal rights and responsibilities (MacDonald 2018, Pouliot 2017:124, see also Bourdieu 1977:72). From a Bourdieusian perspective, hierarchies can be successfully challenged when subordinate actors’ practices of resistance enable them to acquire various forms of symbolic capital and forge supportive relations with others. The trajectory of a specific hierarchy thereby depends on how mastery of the rules of the game enables dominant and subordinate actors to mobilize coalitions and fragment those of their rivals (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014:889-911, Pouliot 2016:56-57, Goddard and Nexon 2016).

Explaining State Building Hierarchies: The Practical Link between Racial Dispositions and Policymaking during Occupation

In the second-half of this article, I explain variation in state building hierarchies during the early 20th Century US occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. These interventions occur between 1915 and 1934 as the United States established regional hegemony in Latin America and made a first attempt to construct a liberal order of sovereign states at the end of World War I. In particular, I examine the community of practice of US policymakers,4 including civilians in Washington as well as US Navy and Marine officers deployed in each country, who made governance decisions during both occupations. These practitioners comprise a community based on intersubjective knowledge about warfare and colonial governance as well as the enactment of practices or repertoires based upon that knowledge. I also evaluate various forms of resistance by occupied peoples to illustrate how their alternative strategies and performances were symbolically understood by US policymakers.

I use recent advances in constructivist methodology to analyze hierarchical contestation in both occupations. Evaluating actors’ embodied depositions requires that I objectify their subjective understandings by placing them within an intertextual context and then historicizing those interpretations within temporal processes (Pouliot 2008). Due to space constraints, I briefly discuss the historical and discursive background of both occupations before developing what Jackson (2007:271) calls a textual ethnography of the 1915-1922 period in which governance hierarchies are initiated and then subsequently vary. I immerse myself in the experiences of dominant and subordinate actors by analyzing primary source documents gathered from seven archival collections as well as the public writings of participants in both occupations. My use of multiple archival sources enables me to develop more objective explanations by triangulating among the perspective of multiple speakers (Pouliot 2010:71). Secondary sources are cited only to establish context and a timeline of events. In applying this method and analytic framework to state building interventions, I emulate historical sociologists who demonstrate how varied practices of formal imperial governance are a function of racialized knowledge about subject peoples and imperial policymakers’ desire to accumulate symbolic capital (Go 2004, Go 2008a, Steinmetz 2007).

As I examine the trajectory of hierarchy in these occupations, I pay specific attention to how US policymakers compare Haitians and Dominicans and how these understandings shape their commonsense of occupation governance. Postcolonial scholars will find these cases relevant since the US occupation of Haiti had an undeniable influence on anticolonial struggles in the early 20th Century (Dalleo 2018). The result is a constructivist twist on the comparative research strategy of “paired comparison” (Tarrow 2010) that avoids treating each occupation as ontologically separate. This approach also enables me to evaluate hierarchies at multiple scales,
from the macro-level of the entire global field through meso-level dyadic relationships down to the micro-level of individuals (Nexon and Neumann 2018:670-671).

My analysis also allows for an evaluation of alternative explanations of hierarchy. Lake’s (2011:5) work is especially relevant given his use of the Dominican Republic to illustrate his theory of relational contracting and the formation of consensual hierarchies. A postcolonial application of practice theory should demonstrate the limited space for bargaining held by subordinate actors and the manufactured quality of consent that characterizes informal empire (Wendt and Friedheim 1995). It also implies that weak states can more effectively challenge power asymmetries when they claim a white Eurocentric identity. According to Meiser (2015), domestic institutions and the anti-imperial norms characteristic of US strategic culture forced policymakers to moderate their expansionist preferences and subsequently enact less severe forms of hierarchy. I can incorporate these factors into my analysis by exploring the relationship between domestic political opportunities that enable challenges to US domination and a subordinate actor’s ability to weaken US policymakers’ symbolic capital. A purely second image explanation would prioritize the former over the latter, while a postcolonial-practice analysis would emphasize the transnational processes that link domestic politics to stratification within regional and global fields of power.

**US State Building in Haiti and the Dominican Republic: 1915-1922**

*The Historical and Discursive Context of US Racial Identity and Liberal Internationalism*

I begin by historicizing the United States as an emergent great power during the 19th Century. Prior to the Civil War, the United States was organized as a racially exclusive polity. US intellectuals claimed that its liberal institutions were a function of the Teutonic origins of US settlers (Cha 1995). Preserving limited government and individual freedom required excluding
inferior races (namely African slaves and indigenous peoples) who were deemed biologically and cognitively incapable of democratic citizenship. An ethnonationalist definition of the United States further enabled a predatory foreign policy of land conquest that ignored the sovereign claims of Mexico and indigenous communities in the drive to realize Manifest Destiny (Horsman 1986). US policymakers also sought to preserve slavery in the Caribbean by refusing sovereign recognition of post-revolutionary Haiti while opposing the United Kingdom’s abolition of colonial slavery (Karp 2016).

The US Civil War led to significant shifts in US identity and its international status that nonetheless preserved white supremacy. The dismantling of slavery, an influx of non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants, and increasing international trade compelled US intellectuals to articulate a partially inclusive nationalism that still denied citizenship rights to the formerly enslaved (Ninkovich 2009:108-166). As the United States enacted the Jim Crow legal regime and segregated the federal workforce (King and Smith 2005, Ambrosius 2007), it simultaneously claimed great power status and disrupted the Eurocentric core-periphery structure of world politics (Buzan and Lawson 2015; Green 2019). The prospect of an internationalist United States led to the construction of an Anglospheric civilizational identity with the United Kingdom throughout the 1890s (Vucetic 2011:22-53). This self-representation reaffirmed US superiority over Latin American polities and constituted the US declaration of war against Spain in 1898 as well as annexations in the Pacific and the Caribbean. With the Roosevelt Corollary, the United States defined itself as a “civilized nation” possessing an “international police power” to rectify “[c]hronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society…” (FRUS 1904:xli; Bowden 2009:151).
More broadly, US policymakers adopted a legalist orientation which extended sovereignty and international law across the globe in ways that accompanied the growing intensity of economic globalization (Coates 2016). Once the abolition of slavery forced manufacturers to seek sources of cotton cultivation in Africa and Asia, they sought out legal and contractual instruments that maintained labor exploitation and necessitated the extension of state power (Beckert 2014:656-666). Attempts to construct a rational-legal order reached their apex during the Wilson Administration’s negotiation of the Versailles Treaty and articulation of self-determination norms, yet these anti-imperial principles were applied only to Eastern European nations (Getachew 2019). Wilson thereby created a new historical context that strengthened anticolonial movements, yet simultaneously perpetuated racial stratification by ignoring non-European sovereign claims (Manela 2009).

Within this context, US intellectuals and policymakers developed multiple Eurocentric discourses that complemented singular or plural representations of civilizational identity (Jackson 2006:82-86; Hobson 2012:5-9). The most prominent was a paternalist universalism articulated in The Journal of Race Development, which suggested that enlightened rule by Anglo-Europeans could lift up racially inferior peoples (Blatt 2018: 72-89). US political scientist Paul Reinsch exemplified this discourse by articulating a norm of benevolent imperialism. To facilitate human progress and economic exchange, Reinsch argued that the United States should establish protectorates over backward territories and promote civilized institutions of self-governance as an alternative to the exploitive “national imperialism” of classic empires (Reinsch 1905:7; Vitalis 2015:43). More aggressive forms of this discourse were common in the US

---

5 Pre-existing standards included centralized institutional governance based on rule of law, respect for individual property rights, and the adoption of European diplomatic practices and norms. See Gong (1984:14-15).
media, which assumed that nations of color like Haiti would unlearn civilized habits without white Anglo-American guidance (Blassingame 1969:30).

If paternalism complemented the partially inclusive postbellum US identity, faith in scientific racism complemented its antebellum self-representation. The belief that non-white peoples were biologically incapable of learning modern governance was common among US intellectuals, including US naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan. In his vision of the world, globalization pitted advanced European empires against backward civilizations and initiated a race war that threatened their dominance of the globe (Barde 2019). But scientific racism could be also be combined with anti-imperialism. In The French Revolution in San Domingo, Lothrop Stoddard (1914) argued that Haiti’s struggle for independence served as a cautionary tale against European contact with supposedly savage Africans (see also Barde 2019:219-220). More generally, racial xenophobia fostered US foreign policy restraint by undermining attempts to annex non-white territories after the Civil War (Maass 2020).

These historical and discursive contexts structured the disposition of a community of practitioners who administered the occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Policymakers, including President Wilson, understood the United States possessing the authority to uphold civilized standards and promote Pan-American cooperation (Gilderhus 1980). Greater US involvement in each country resolved challenges to this role posed by potential European interventions to recover debts and further maintained a Caribbean sphere of influence (Tillman 2016:28-36; Schmidt 1971:52-55). Each intervention was also initiated in partnership with the First National City Bank of New York, into which Dominican customs and the gold reserves of the Banque Nationale d’Haiti were deposited (Schoultz 1998:185-188, 209; Renda 2001:98-99).  

---

6 Roosevelt’s imperialist views were somewhere between paternalism and scientific racism. Although he believed in racial reform, he doubted the ability of Asians and Africans to become civilized. See Wertheim (2009:498:500).
In the eyes of US officials, these developments resolved the financial problems of both countries, yet were only precursors to more intense rule.

Military Coercion and the Vesting of Haitian Authority in the United States

The US occupation of Haiti began with an initial landing of Marines in July 1915 and was formalized over subsequent months. On September 3, US Navy Admiral William B. Caperton synthesized the standard of civilization and the French revolutionary tradition by publicly justifying martial law in Port-au-Prince as “necessary for the establishment and maintenance of the fundamental rights of man…” (FRUS 1915:484) Caperton’s declaration followed unrest generated by the National Assembly’s selection of a new president, Sudré Dartiguenave, who had been handpicked by US officials (Renda 2001:30-31). The occupation was then legalized with the Haitian Senate’s passage of a treaty that permitted the appointment of US civilian advisers to informally control Haiti’s public finances, public works, and authorized the Marines to create a new constabulary force. Caperton directly interfered with treaty deliberations by threatening to prosecute senators for bribery if they opposed ratification (Schmidt 1995: 75-76). Although US authority was recognized by the Haitian government, it was prompted by US coercion.

Caperton’s declaration as well as the writings of US diplomats indicate a paternalist disposition to uphold civilized standards in the face of Haitian incapacity for self-governance.⁷ On August 6, one diplomat wrote that Haitian self-dealing “produced a condition of frenzy which resulted in startling barbarities” and could only be resolved by “breaking the power of professional revolutionists and their supporters…”⁸ Since Dartiguenave “is not a strong man and

---

⁷ I focus here on the paternalism of occupation officials and note that it was broadly consistent with Wilson’s. See Renda (2001:89-130) and Tillman (2016:78-81).
⁸ State Department 1965, Central Decimal File 838.00/1426.
is easily influenced,” he was seen as a malleable client. The coercive establishment of US authority was necessary given the United States’ responsibilities to the world: “sane men of all countries…will applaud the adopting by the United States of a course calculated to offer a real remedy for an intolerable situation.” It was also possible because other Latin American nations viewed Haiti as different and would not oppose the United States. According to Wilson, “[t]he effect on ‘Latin America’ of our course down there will not, we think, be serious, because, being negroes, they are not regard as of the fraternity!’ (Wilson 1981: 209). US policymakers’ habitus combined with Haiti’s position at the bottom of the regional field rendered coercive bargaining as the only practical response.

Day-to-day governance fell to the Marines, whose dispositions were more structured by scientific racism. Littleton Waller, US Marine commander in-country, described Haitians using the same racial slur applied to the formerly enslaved in the United States, indicating both could be governed similarly. He further suggested that all Haitians could be treated the same regardless of their racial composition: “Now to understand the situation you must try to understand the Haitian negro, whether colored or black” (Waller to Lejeune August 20, 1916, Lejeune Papers, Reel 3). Smedley Butler, the US Marine officer who would be appointed commander of the new Gendarmerie, shared this sentiment: “this country shall be run as a piece of machinery, with no preference being shown to any negro owing to a supposed superiority due to the infusement of white blood in their veins” (Butler to Lejeune, 13 July 1916, Lejeune Papers, Reel 3).

---

9 State Department 1965, 838.00/1427.
10 State Department 1965, 838.00/1426.
11To quote Waller directly: “I understand that I have tremendous weight with the people and I say this without any spirit of egotism, I know the nigger and how to handle him” (Waller to Lejeune, June 11, 1916, Lejeune Papers, Reel 3, my italics). Waller’s disposition was likely shaped by the massacre of his slave-owning ancestors in the Nat Turner slave rebellion of 1831 (Schmidt 1998:84). I ordinarily would not print or say aloud Waller’s use of a racial slur. However, his use of the slur (learned in the context of US domestic politics) to explain how he understood Haitians is clear and unmistakable evidence of how racism shaped his own disposition. I offer this justification out of respect to the reader.
Papers, Reel 3). Any future *Gendarmerie* commander would have to be “some man to whom the habits of ‘cockroaches’ are not so repugnant as to me” (Butler to Lejeune, 13 July 1916, Lejeune Papers, Reel 3).

These dispositions corresponded to different understandings of how much authority was required to achieve US objectives. Butler and Waller sought *Gendarmerie* control of public works and all communications services once Dartiguenave’s “wretched government” began to resist US demands (Butler to Lejeune, 25 June 1916, Lejeune Papers, Reel 3). But Caperton disapproved of Waller’s proposal since it “does savor of militarism” (Caperton to Waller, 22 June 1916, Caperton Papers, Box 1, Folder 1) and could set a precedent for Haitian military control (Caperton to Benson, 26 June 1916, Caperton Papers, Box 1, Folder 1). In turn, Waller criticized him for governing from afar (he had proceeded to occupy the Dominican Republic) and undermining Marine rule: “It is just impossible for him to manage at that distance and with that loss of time.” (Waller to Lejeune, 26 June 1916, Lejeune Papers, Reel 3). Yet Caperton stuck to his legalist position: “[w]e must admit that the convention does not give us, unfortunately, the control of these utilities,” while his paternalism led him to disapprove of Waller’s more aggressive relationship with Haitian officials: “I think he has been very vindictive, showed a lack of consideration, and in a manner, I might say, used intimidation in his dealings with the Haitien Government” in ways that undermined the occupation’s popularity (Caperton to Benson, 20 July 1916, Caperton Papers, Box 1, Folder 5).

Despite Caperton’s concerns, the flow of events made expanded control practically necessary. US Marine officer Eli Cole considered outright military rule in 1917 since Dartiguenave could not establish “a reasonably efficient government.”12 This realization shaped

12 State Department 1965, 838.00/1458, “Conditions in Haiti.”
the US response to the Haitian National Assembly’s near enactment of a constitution in June 1917 that preserved the existing ban on foreign ownership of property (Schoultz 1998:233). Butler directly threatened Dartiguenave with military government to compel his dissolution of the National Assembly, who finally agreed to do so by a decree read by Butler to Haitian lawmakers. Informed by paternalism, the text justified closing the Assembly as necessary to achieve “certain constitutional reform’s [sic] exempt from all party spirit and inspired by a desire to launch the country into the way of Progress and Civilization…” One year later, a new constitution written by the State Department was ratified by an extralegal plebiscite that recognized international firms’ property rights. The Gendarmerie ensured its passage by encouraging Haitian officials to mobilize public support and ordered the arrest of any opponents (Chief, Gendarmerie d’Haiti memo, May 20, 1918, Russell Papers, Series 2.3, Box 1, Folder 11).

Overall, the Haitian government’s investiture of authority into US hands was anything but well-planned or consensual. Varying paternalist or scientific realist dispositions constituted US officials with a divergent sense of how much authority was necessary to achieve their objectives. Although legal consent was normatively required by Caperton and US civilian policymakers, they still agreed with Marine officers that coercive bargaining inspired by a logic of consequences was necessary. The imposition of US rule was informed by policymakers’ understanding of their superior field position and role as agents of civilizational uplift while Haitians were viewed as racially inferior and unable to master competent governance practices. Haiti was thus positioned in the lowest possible ranking in the regional field. The US-Haiti governance hierarchy became increasingly unequal as Haiti’s choice to delegate domestic

13 State Department 1965, 838.00/1467.

Racial Hierarchy and US State Building
authority was compromised at each moment of contestation, and US rule became increasingly imperial despite recognition of a local government.

Military Government by ‘Accident’ in the Dominican Republic

The establishment of US authority over the Dominican Republic was more rapid and direct but equally haphazard. Caperton left Haiti for its neighbor in May 1916 following an uprising led by Defense Minister Desiderio Arias and the collapse of any government which could uphold the 1907 treaty (FRUS 1916:228; Schoultz 1998:207-208). As the Marines pacified the country, Caperton negotiated with the Dominican legislature and sought selection of a temporary president who would give the United States similar powers as in Haiti. But he found Dominican elites wholly untrustworthy and negatively compared them to their Haitian counterparts: “I really believe these people are worse than the Haitiens, if such a thing be possible, and I am more convinced each day that the only way to handle them is by force and the big stick. Their rascality, grafting and total unreliability, is beyond all conception” (Caperton to Benson, June 15, 1916, Caperton Papers, Box 1, Folder 1). Waller felt similarly while observing from Haiti and called for the same coercive rule in both countries: “The San Domingans have not received sufficient punishment ot [sic] make them fear. You cannot rule these people except by dominating them and ruling them with a firm hand. This applies to all of them without exception” (Waller to Lejeune, 20 August, 1916, Lejeune Papers, Reel 3). Given the Dominicans’ incapacity for proper governance, coercion was the commonsensical way to uphold civilized standards.

Once US officials viewed Dominican elites as lacking the capacity for self-governance, they were inclined to override them. On July 25, the legislature selected Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal as provisional president (FRUS 1916:233). But Henríquez evaded US demands to
authorize the creation of a Marine-officered constabulary and sought revenue for government operations from the US-appointed customs receiver, who otherwise withheld funding based on the perception of Dominican corruption and incompetence (Ibid.:235-237). When Henríquez prepared to organize new elections that could have given Arias control over the government, US officials preempted him by imposing military government in late November (Ibid.:241-243). Caperton’s successor, US Navy officer Harry Knapp, justified expanding US rule based on the need to restore the Dominican Republic’s ability to fulfill “the obligations resting upon it as one of the family of nations” (Ibid.:247).

As in Haiti, paternalist discourses embodied by US policymakers made possible intervention in the Dominican Republic. But the situational context obviated the delegation of authority by Dominican officials into their American counterparts. Knapp later described military rule as required by the increasingly limited personnel capabilities of Henríquez’s government rather than a preplanned outcome: “By the accident that the Dominicans deserted their posts it became necessary to put American officers in charge of the administration of several Dominican government departments.”14 For Knapp, this was the only practical response given the inability of Dominicans to competently self-govern: “almost all the vexatious questions have been eliminated that would have arisen in the endeavor to control Dominicans in the administering of these offices….“15

Once local rule collapsed, the most commonsensical course of action remaining for US policymakers was to seize complete authority.

By 1917, the degree of hierarchy established by the United States was slightly more intense in the Dominican Republic than Haiti. While discursive structures constituted the dominant or subordinate field positions of each state, explaining hierarchical variation requires

---

14 SD 838.00/1464, Knapp to Daniels, 1917.
15 Ibid.
analyzing the dispositions of US policymakers who viewed coercive bargaining as a logical response to the perceived failures of Haitians and Dominicans. Navy and Marine officers initially sought legal authorization for US rule but then took extralegal action to achieve US objectives as required by the circumstances. Since US officials assumed governance over domestic politics by investing authority in themselves via military government, early state building in the Dominican Republic was more hierarchical than in Haiti.

**Race, Identity, and Resistance to US Occupations**

Two years later, the loss of local authority and atrocities committed by the Marines led to various forms of violent and non-violent mobilizations against each occupation. These included not only Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association and its hybrid claims to sovereignty (Shilliam 2006; see also Mayes 2015:97-112; Plummer 2015), but also advocacy by Haitian and Dominican elites who fostered a network of supporters across the hemisphere. Their increasing opposition served as the background the 1920 presidential election campaign, in which Republican candidate Warren G. Harding castigated the Wilson administration for its imperialist adventures in the Caribbean (Schoultz 1998:255). The 1920 election, along with the anti-imperialist spirit unwittingly fostered by the Versailles Peace Conference, served as an opportunity to challenge US expansion that Haitians, Dominicans, and their supporters would use in different ways.

Haitian advocacy efforts were led by James Weldon Johnson of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), who challenged racial hierarchy in both domestic and world politics by partnering with prominent Haitians and directly lobbying Harding. After traveling to the country in early 1920, Johnson supported the formation of the *Union Patriotique d’Haiti* among Haitian elites and urged his colleagues to “take advantage” of
the 1920 election by sending a mission to Washington demanding the restoration of self-
government (Johnson to Borno, 5 November 1920, Johnson Papers, Box 8, Folder 160). In his
public remarks, Johnson celebrated the “glorious history” of the Haitian people who founded
“the first of the American Republics, after the United States, to gain its independence” (Johnson
1920:218). He further rejected the association of Blackness with savagery by making an African
claim to the origins of civilization: “The truth is: the torch of civilization was lighted on the
banks of the Nile, and we can trace the course of that torch, sometimes flaming, sometimes
flickering, and at times all but extinguished” as it eventually made its way to “Northern Europe”
(Johnson, “Africa At the Peace Table and the Descendants of Africans in Our American
Democracy,” Johnson Papers, Box 76, Folder 463).

These statements indicate how Haitian advocates valued Blackness and rejected any need
for subordination to whites. According to Arthur Holly, whom Johnson met during his 1920 trip,
Haitian independence could be restored through closer ties with its racial partners: “[a]bove all,
is the idea of establishing, thro’ your influence, a sort of alliance between the young intelligent
Haytians with their Brothers in the United States” (Holly to Johnson, December 10, 1920,
Johnson Papers, Box 8, Folder 180). Racial self-reliance rather than European tutelage was
congruent with the public speeches of Haitian diplomat Jean Price-Mars, a Union Patriotique
member who inverted the logic of paternalism. Price-Mars argued that Haiti’s downfall was due
to its post-independence elites’ mimicking the “indifference” of French slave owners to the
suffering of enslaved Haitians: “I compare it to the detachment of the colonial master who was
only concerned with the capacity of material production of his slaves. This resembles the same
inhumanity, the same incapacity to understand the true interest of the masses and the peasants”

16 Johnson sent a similar letter to every leading Haitian he met during his trip. See Johnson Papers, Box 8, Folders 180-185.
(Price-Mars 1919: 14). To realize national renewal, leading Haitians had to forge national bonds with their fellow citizens as well as their racial allies abroad.

Dominican elites also sought to influence US domestic politics by organizing internal and external opposition. Nationalist intellectuals founded the *Unión Nacional Dominicana* to unify domestic resistance to the occupation (Tillman 2016:149). Henríquez y Carvajal hired Horace Knowles, a former US minister to the Dominican Republic, to contest US governance practices directly to administration officials and members of Congress (McPherson 2014:166-167; SD 839.00/2393-2408). These efforts were reinforced by Henríquez’s diplomatic mobilization of Latin American states as part of an emergent soft balancing coalition opposed to the expansion of US regional hegemony (Long and Friedman 2015). He sought “the expression of sympathy and of favorable opinion manifested by sister Republics…and that they are disposed to look for equal rights for all the peoples which constitute the society of Pan-Americanism, and even more, of Spanish-Americanism” (quoted in SD 839.00/2345, Knapp to Daniels, 1921). Diplomatic pressure was subsequently noted by Caperton, who wrote that US occupations had “been quoted as evidence of aggressive intent” during his official tours of South America and generated hostility toward Washington (“Naval Policy in South Atlantic”, 10 November 1918, Caperton Papers, Box 1, Folder 6).

Dominicans elites, however, did not pursue solidarity with their Haitian neighbors. Lorgia García-Peña (2016:58-92) and April Mayes (2016:112-115) demonstrate how *dominicanidad* (Dominican national identity) was defined in terms of Spanish-European heritage and subsequently adopted subjectivities associated with whiteness in opposition to Blackness. The Dominicans’ sense of difference is illustrated by local political leaders’ responses to US queries regarding the prospect of changing Santo Domingo’s name to Hispaniola. Like other
local officials, one provincial governor emphasized Dominicans’ Spanish identity while suggesting that Haitians were racially and linguistically different:

“the name of Santo Domingo for the entire island would have the inconvenience that the Haitians would be generally known as Dominicans, an idea, which they would not for one moment consider under any condition, in the same manner, that we should not like to be known as Haitians…Nor would the Spaniards care to have the Haitians known as Spaniards or Hispaniolanias, since they are not of the Spanish race, nor would the Haitians, themselves be satisfied with this either, since if they have any sympathy at all with any of the European races, it is with the French, whose language they speak and understand, and not the Spaniards.” (Civil Governor Santo Domingo Province to Military Governor, 30 May 1918, Folder: Santo Domingo, Office of Mil. Government, Box 2).

These understandings of a homogenized Dominican identity inhibited the emergence of a broad-based anti-imperial coalition that included Haiti. Johnson explicitly sought these kinds of solidarities by founding the Haiti Santo Domingo Independence Society (HSDIS) in the United States, but he was always aware that such support was lacking. During his 1920 trip to Haiti, he noted the need to end “[t]he isolation of Haiti on account of language not only from USA, but from her sister Latin-American republics” and repeated the same language in a 1922 HSDIS letter to supporters (Note 166, envelope D, Johnson Papers, Box 85, Folder 646; HSDIS letter, January 30, 1922, Johnson Papers, Box 8, Folder 187). State Department officials also understood that Haitian claims for assistance from other states went ignored, unlike the Dominicans (McPherson 2014:173). Just as Wilson predicted in 1915, the Haitians were still seen as different and received no assistance from other states in the region.

**US Perceptions of Racial Difference and Withdrawal from the Dominican Republic**

As the occupations wore on, US policymakers adopted similar representations of racial identity offered by Dominicans. Paternalistic discourses suggested that past exposure to European rule made self-governance by a racially inferior group more plausible. If so, then Haitians and Dominicans’ varied history of European tutelage contributed to racial differentiation. According to US Marine officer George C. Thorpe (1920:76), the Haitian
Revolution inhibited the civilizational advancements enjoyed by the Dominicans: “The outstanding result of the greater success of native arms against the foreigner in Haiti...is that Haiti, now known as the Black Republic, is far less civilized than Santo Domingo, known as the Mulatto Republic.” Hence, “the Dominican is far more amenable to educating processes than is the Haitian caco” (Ibid.).

Another US Marine relied on biological racial difference to suggest that effective recruits lacked African ancestry: “…practically all of our best non-commissioned officers were either of Porto Rican descent, or had a larger proportion of Spanish than of negro blood in their veins” (Fellowes 1923:231). According to one State Department official, when Haitian Gendarmerie units were “officered by white officers (marines) they are efficient and dependable; where they are under native Haitians, they cannot be depended on to stand in a crisis” (Daily Report, April 5, 1919, FDR Papers, Box 14, Folder “Interdepartmental Correspondence”). Whether their dispositions were structured by paternalist or scientific racist discourses, US policymakers’ tacit knowledge of racial difference implied that Dominicans were capable of reform while Haitians were unable to learn civilized ways of life.

US officials’ adoption of these different representations of identity enabled the Dominican Republic to climb the ranks of the regional field. As international dissatisfaction with the US occupation intensified, US policymakers subsequently found it practical to relinquish control of the country. Following Harding’s election victory, the State Department sought to resolve “the anxiety expressed by the governments of other American republics as to our intentions in Santo Domingo…” (FRUS 1920:136) and recommended withdrawal from the Dominican Republic. The announcement was made on December 23, the day after Henríquez’s

---

17 Mayes (2015: 95-115) provides a detailed analysis of US racial attitudes toward Dominicans.
brother arrived in Montevideo and was expected to criticize the US occupation. Negotiations would proceed into 1922 over the withdrawal process and would finally be completed in 1924.

As for Haiti, US policymakers’ experience of white racial domination in domestic politics disposed them to continue the occupation. In 1921, Knapp described Haiti as a nation “composed of the slaves freed at the end of the civil war.” Since 1865, their progressive development “has been made in the constant presence of white people” while “[t]he people of Haiti have had no immediate contact with a superior civilization and intelligence such as the negroes of the United States have since their emancipation.” Further, the absence of an “intelligent and educated electorate” that could constitute a functional rule of law democracy made criticism of US violations of Haitian sovereignty irrelevant.

On this basis, Dartiguenave’s call to replace the occupation with a military assistance mission and reconstitute the National Assembly through new elections was not supported by US officials (FRUS 1921:193, 197-202). Although consistent with a legalist interpretation of sovereign self-determination, these proposals contradicted the maximally asymmetric positions of the United States and Haiti as well as the paternalist habit of racial tutelage. Knapp was disposed to view these demands as impractical and illustrated Haitian incompetence: “it is my conviction that the results of the last five years would be in large measures lost, and thus Haiti would start at once on a backward course instead of continuing on a forward course.”

US diplomats agreed based on a direct comparison with the Dominicans, who “have a preponderance of white blood and culture. The Haitians on the other hand are negro for the most

---

18 SD 839.00/2284a, Welles to Lansing, 1920.
19 SD 838.00/1744, Knapp to Daniels, 1921.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 SD 838.00/1744, Knapp to Daniels, 1921.
part, and...are almost in a state of savagery and complete ignorance. The two situations thus
demand different treatment”.

By virtue of its inferior racial composition and revolt against
France, Haiti was again understood as occupying the lowest position in the regional field: “From
those days down to 1915 the history of Hayti is the blackest spot in all the Americas” (US State
Department, “Memorandum in regard to Hayti,” 1922, exact date unknown, FDR Papers, Box 41, Folder “Trip to Haiti, 1917”). John H. Russell, the US Marine commander in Haiti following
Harding’s inauguration, was also disposed to continue the occupation. Both paternalist and
offensive racist discourses shaped his proposal for consolidating US authority in the hands of a
single official. “The general dislike of the black man for the white” (Russell, “Memorandum
Regarding a Constructive Policy for Haiti,” 1 October 1922, Russell Papers, Series 2.5, Box 1,
Folder 13) explained the inability of Haitian officials to accept subordination in relation to
civilized Anglo-Americans. Unlike the conciliatory relationship State Department officials
proposed for the Dominican Republic, Russell argued “the United States must have a
CONTROL over HAITIEN AFFAIRS” (Ibid.).

The tacit knowledge that Haiti was unprepared for self-governance was shared by a US
Senate special committee formed in 1921 to investigate occupation abuses. Haitian and
Dominican representatives pressed their case at public hearings with assistance from their
respective US supporters, but Haitians were understood as manipulative. Butler refuted claims
that Dartiguenave was pressured into dissolving the National Assembly in 1917 by presenting
the signed decree to the committee (Thomas 2015:142). As for the Dominicans, they carefully
acknowledged the United States’ civilized status by discussing it as an advanced society worthy
of admiration (McPherson 2014:177-178). In the committee’s final report, it made no proposal

23 SD 839.00/2451, Mayer to Hughes, 1921.
regarding the Dominican Republic but warned that withdrawal from Haiti would result in “the abandonment of the Haitian people to chronic revolution, anarchy, barbarism, and ruin” (US Senate 1922:26), the same uncivilized conditions that prevailed before the occupation. By the end of 1922, Russell had been appointed American High Commissioner with consolidated power over all US appointees. Once the occupation was stabilized, the US occupation continued until 1934.

*Evaluating Explanations of Hierarchy*

A practice theory analysis of race in the Haitian and Dominican occupations demonstrates how the discursive context of white supremacy unequally constituted subordinate actors’ with the ability to contest hierarchies. During the early years of both occupations, US officials viewed their Haitian and Dominican counterparts as wholly lacking symbolic capital due to their inability to perform competent governance practices. These perceptions were consistent with how US officials understood themselves within a Eurocentric regional field as well as the long history of white racial domination within the United States. But the regional field also enabled Dominicans to challenge US authority by embracing whiteness and mobilizing a supportive transnational coalition. These self-representations matched those of US officials, who were disposed to view Dominicans as more capable of civilization by virtue of their longer history of European socialization. In this context, the occupation eroded US symbolic capital because it violated a rightful Dominican claim to sovereignty and self-determination that other Latin American states recognized. Once US rule became a liability, US withdrawal became a commonsensical response.

But Dominican liberation came at Haiti’s expense. Haiti’s Black racial identity, shared by its leading supporters in the United States and others in the region, fixed its position at the
bottom of the Eurocentric field. Advancing up the field’s ranks would require challenging not just the US claim to hegemonic leadership, but overturning the entire logic of stratification that constituted Blackness and whiteness as maximally inferior and superior (respectively).

Advocates like Johnson, who endowed Blackness with symbolic capital, sought this outcome. But the Dominican construction of its identity as white and different from Black Haiti made this impossible. Along with their Spanish-speaking supporters, Dominican elites reaffirmed white supremacy within the Western Hemisphere and the symbolic value of whiteness. In this way, Dominican elites contested US authority while simultaneously orchestrating a new relationship with the United States that preserved the logic of racial hierarchy. Haiti was thus left without allies. Once resistance to the US occupations was fragmented along racial lines, the United States then strengthened and perpetuated its quasi-imperial rule over Haiti at no cost while relaxing it in the Dominican Republic.

A postcolonial-practice analysis can help us address the theoretical shortcomings of narrow dyadic theories of hierarchy and asymmetry. Relational contracting anticipates that variation in governance hierarchies is a function of different preferences among dominant and subordinate actors. However, events from 1920 onward challenge this prediction. Both polities’ leadership call for the lessening of US authority, yet US officials accede to subordinate demands only in the Dominican Republic while Haitian demands are swept aside. Since relational contracting assumes that all hierarchies require consent and must incorporate subordinate preferences, this outcome cannot be fully explained. A relational contracting approach would expect that US officials’ attempt to maintain the same level of hierarchy in Haiti would subsequently fail. Instead, US authority was strengthened. The early days of the Haitian occupation also demonstrate how consent can be manufactured rather than freely given. US
officials do bargain with Haitian counterparts over the enactment of the 1915 treaty and the dissolution of the National Assembly, but they do so in coercive ways that erode Haitian autonomy.

What about weak state coalition formation? The above analysis demonstrates how systems of stratification condition which actors may successfully form coalitions. Haitian elites were never able to develop partnerships that could make the US occupation costly because their Black identity was undervalued and not shared by other Latin American states. However, the Dominican Republic’s coalition was forged precisely on the basis of its claim to a white identity that resonated with other sovereigns in the hemisphere. By centering our analysis on racial stratification, we can gain a fuller picture of the dynamics of how weak actors build coalitions to challenge strong counterparts.

Theories of imperial restraint that emphasize domestic institutions and norms also struggle to explain variation in hierarchies. As both occupations became increasingly costly after 1919 and contradicted US anti-imperial norms, second image explanations predict that Republican opposition to Wilson’s expansion in the Caribbean would generate greater foreign policy restraint following the 1920 election cycle and during Harding’s presidency. Withdrawal from the Dominican Republic is consistent with this prediction, but the continued occupation of Haiti is not. The persistence of the US occupation thereby remains an unsolved puzzle unless we incorporate international and transnational factors that interact with domestic politics. Foreign policy restraint became operative when Dominican elites mobilized international pressure that made occupation more costly and activated anti-imperial norms. Not only did Haiti’s elites lack an interstate coalition that could challenge the United States for violating liberal principles, but parallel racial hierarchies within US society constituted Haiti as lacking a right to invoke self-
determination and sovereignty. The racial rules of the domestic political game thereby rendered anti-imperial norms less relevant and made continued occupation less costly.

How can we make sense of these theoretical shortcomings and the contribution of a postcolonial-practice approach to the study of hierarchy? First, consent and legitimacy must be understood within a social context that emphasizes orchestration among many actors rather than a purely dyadic one that focuses only on bargaining between two actors entering into a contract. How dominant and subordinate actors are unequally constituted within a stratified system as well as their claims to symbolic capital shapes how others view contestation over hierarchy. It also enables or inhibits coalition formation: successful resistance requires that third-party actors acknowledge hierarchy as illegitimate and worthy of renegotiation. By claiming whiteness and reaffirming anti-Blackness, Dominican elites made US recognition of their autonomy more practical while reinforcing the maximally unequal positions of Haitians, thereby permitting US officials to deny their claims to autonomy. Coalitions can enable weaker states to contest dominant state policies, but the macro-level context of stratification can prevent some weak states from attracting allies.

Second, a postcolonial-practice analysis also demonstrates how stratification provides the setting in which policy costs and normative expectations are given meaning within domestic politics. Dominican elites’ ability to gain recognition of their Spanish-European identity combined with the perception of Haitian Blackness affected how US policymakers understood the occupations. In the context of discourses that naturalized racial hierarchy both domestically and internationally, domestic institutions and norms could generate imperial restraint only if expansion was inconsistent with the global field position of the United States as well as the racial field structuring its domestic politics. However, the maximal devaluation of Black identities
normalized white domination in both systems of stratification. When US officials compared Black US citizens and Black Haitians to each other, they suggested that denial of their rights was necessary to realize liberal progress in the United States and across the globe. Since racial hierarchy in domestic and world politics was complementary, the ongoing occupation of Black Haiti could not provoke a domestic backlash that threatened the political standing of US policymakers.

Lastly, the above analysis also illustrates precisely how structures get translated into governance practices that instantiate hierarchy. Racialized discourses alone cannot explain why slight variations in US governance hierarchies emerged in the first years of the occupations despite initially similar representations of Haitians and Dominicans. However, a focus on dispositions does allow us to evaluate how the *habitus* of US policymakers interacted with the unique circumstances of each occupation to generate marginally more intense hierarchy in the Dominican Republic. Overall, a postcolonial-practice approach allows us to reintroduce agency into our analysis of hierarchical relationships without sacrificing structural claims about the unequal constitution of subjectivities.

**Conclusion**

This article demonstrates how a postcolonial-practice theory approach can tell us much about the contestation of governance hierarchies among unequal sovereigns. Variation in hierarchies established during the US occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic were a result of the interaction between racialized dispositions held by policymakers and forms of resistance by subordinate actors that both challenged and reproduced racial stratification. This approach is useful because it can enhance our explanations of specific governance arrangements beyond our existing theories of hierarchy.
More broadly, the persistence of US domination over Haiti despite its advocates’ invocation of liberal norms complicates mainstream narratives about the benevolence of US hegemony during the 20th Century. Haiti’s subordination demonstrates how race remained a foundational ordering principle of world politics during the initial establishment of the liberal order. It further suggests avenues of future research regarding the global expansion of liberal rules and arrangements after 1945. If race constituted variation in the postwar US alliance network (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002), then we might also expect it to generate variation in hierarchies among military occupations established by the victorious Allies.

Finally, this research reminds us of the importance of transnational solidarities in defense of racial equality. For emancipatory resistance among peoples of color to be successful, subordinate actors need broad-based coalitions inclusive of all oppressed peoples that rigorously challenge white supremacy in both domestic and world politics. Although the general acceptance of racial hierarchy during the early 20th Century undermined such movements, the periodic emergence of radical egalitarian coalitions within the United States suggests that more robust challenges are possible (King and Smith 2005). The domestic success of these coalitions depends upon challenging white supremacy within the United States and amplifying demands for equality among dominated peoples abroad. Unless the value of whiteness is contested at all levels, it will continue to reconstitute racial hierarchy at home and internationally.

Acknowledgements
I thank Lourdes Aguas, Mauro Caraccioli, Tobias Lemke, Michael McIntyre, Jeffrey Meiser, Randolph Persaud, Blair Marcus Proctor, Eric Rittinger, Andrew Szarejko, and Srdjan Vucetic for helpful comments and suggestions, and Julia Thornton and Conor Tobin for their assistance with various elements of the research. All errors are my own.
References


Johnson, James Weldon Papers (Johnson Papers). New Haven, CT: Yale University.


64-85.


